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 Viewpoint: Fineman and Vulnerability 
 
This viewpoint piece will argue that the work of the American feminist political and 
legal philosopher, Martha Fineman can be the basis for a shift away from the 
proceduralism and managerialism that has come to dominate approaches to social 
work practice. Fineman’s work calls for a radical rethinking of societal notions of 
concepts such as autonomy and vulnerability. One of the key features of the political 
and social dominance of neoliberalism has been the focus on individualism. 
Alongside the emphasis placed on the need for the introduction of market 
mechanisms into all areas of life, this is the essence of neoliberal philosophy. The 
concept of individualism raises important questions for professions such as social 
work that are explicitly concerned with broader notions of social justice. For 
neoliberalism, inequality is a fact of human life – put simply; we are not equal – not 
in terms of the law or civic rights, but in terms of skills and abilities. Social work in 
challenging discrimination, disadvantage and oppression has used political 
language and discourse that focuses on human rights of both individuals and 
groups. However, as Fraser (2013) has argued this discourse of individual rights has  
been taken up most effectively by neoliberalism. The effect is to empty the discourse  
of the broader concerns with social justice that were at the heart of the original  
challenge to the failings of the welfare state that were a feature of the  
Radical writers of the 1970s such as IIich (1973). Giroux (2011) argues that 
neoliberalism has been successful in pushing out notions such as “social goods” or 
“community” from broader policy debates.  
 
 
Vulnerability  
It is a feature of all professional fields that those working within them use some 
forms of jargon or shorthand. This seems almost inevitable. It does serve to establish 
and maintain professional identities and boundaries. Social work appears to be 
particularly prone to bouts of this -for example struggling to agree even on a term 
for those who use services. Various terms -service user, client, customer and expert by 
experience have all been or continued to be used in various contexts (Mclaughlin, 
2009). However, none of them is without fault and none really captures the 
complexity of social work relationships. The use of language is clearly vitally 
important. Beckett (2003) notes that social work practice is replete with metaphors 
drawn from the military and war. An approach that is encapsulated in the fact that 
the Fast Track scheme in children and families social work was given the title 
Frontline (www.frontline.org.uk). Wacquant in his discussion of the development of 
penal policy identifies what he terms “doxa” (Cummins, 2015). Doxa are terms that 
construct and limit the parameters of debates. In the penal field, they would include 
terms such as “prison works” and “zero tolerance”. In any area, there will be a series of 
doxa. Wacquant argues that they become terms that are used almost unthinkingly. 
Critical perspectives and approaches require the interrogation of doxa.  
 
 
Vulnerability has, I would argue, become one of the doxa of social work. Using 
Fineman’s challenge to the term, we can deconstruct its current use as part of a 
radical reimagining of social state (Cummins, 2018). Vulnerability has become a term 
that is in increasingly common usage across the social welfare field. It is a term that 
is poorly defined. It is used in a variety of fields of settings. It is applied to 
individuals, communities and population groups. In social work, it is used in both 
adults and children’s services. It is used in the context of abuse and/ or exploitation -
the role of agencies being to protect vulnerable individuals. This use of the term has 
been seen as overly paternalistic. For example, No Secrets defined a ‘vulnerable adult’ 
as a person: “who is or may be in need of community care services by reason of mental or 
other disability, age or illness; and who is or may be unable to take care of him or herself, or 
unable to protect him or herself against significant harm or exploitation”.  
The Care Act 2014 has superseded this. The Care Act uses the term ‘an adult at risk.’ 
An adult at risk of abuse or neglect is defined as someone who has needs for care 
and support, who is experiencing, or at risk of, abuse or neglect and because of their 
care needs -is unable to protect themselves. No Secrets and the Care Act are both 
based on an essentially individualised conception of vulnerability and risk. This can 
lead to a limited focus on the circumstances of an individual rather than a more 
community based or ecological approach, particularly in assessment processes. 
They, perhaps, unintentionally, focus on a deficit model looking at ways or 
circumstances, in which, individuals might be or become vulnerable. This approach 
also leads to the identification of vulnerable populations or groups.  
 
 
The use of the term “vulnerability” has its roots in the biological and life sciences.  
In the 1980s, it was a term that was rarely used. It first appeared more widely in  
The 1990s but since 2000, there has been an explosion in the use of the term. The  
term originates in risk research that examines the causes and impacts of natural  
disasters. It was used as a way of examining the ways, in which, structures and  
institutions may prevent or add to the consequences of a natural disaster.  
For example, an earthquake is a potential natural disaster. In considering the risks  
or vulnerability of a region, one would need to consider not only the likelihood of  
such an event, alongside the impact of the size of the quake. In addition, the physical  
In addition, social infrastructure will be a factor in the calculation of any potential 
impact.  
This will include an analysis of the design of the buildings and their ability to  
resist shocks as well the state resources that would be available to respond to such  
an event.  
 
 
  
 Vulnerability is now a term that is central to psychology, sociology and social work 
(Spini et al 2013). The looseness of the definition means that it can be used across 
disciplines. One approach is to regard vulnerability as reflecting a broad terms, a 
lack of resources that individuals or communities possess. This means that 
individuals or groups are at increased risk of experiencing stress factors. They then 
face greater challenges in coping with these stressors or recovering from their 
impact. One can see the application of this model in the exploration of the links 
between poverty and mental health (Cummins, 2018) .The links between socio-
economic factors and mental health play out in a number of complex ways. 
Psychosocial factors such as ongoing acute stress can have a detrimental impact on 
an individual’s mental health (Wilkinson, 2017). People from marginalised groups, 
for example asylum seekers and refugees or those who have experienced other forms 
of trauma, are more vulnerable to the development of mental health problems. The 
stresses of the daily experiences and pressures of living in poverty such as debt 
worry about being able to cope with emergencies and precarious accommodation 
can all contribute to poor mental health (Elliott, 2016).  
 
Fineman on autonomy and vulnerability  
Fineman’s work (2004 and 2008) challenges two deeply engrained but interrelated 
social and cultural tropes and ideas. The first is the notion of autonomy. In The 
Autonomy Myth (2004), Fineman argues that the cultural focus on individualism 
hides the social reality of our interconnectedness. In reality, we all need or will need 
some care at points in our lives. It is impossible to make to adulthood without being 
cared for by others. In adulthood, we do not when we might need some form of care 
and what our care needs might be. Fineman argues that political discourse and 
welfare policy is based on the notion of the liberal subject. This is an idealised 
version of the individual citizen. Such citizens are independent, autonomous adults.  
Many of the social arrangements and institutions that have the most profound 
impact on individual lives are regarded as private -i.e. beyond the state (Fineman 
2004). There are complex issues involved here as clearly the state intervenes in 
family life in a wide range of ways. In addition, Fineman is writing largely in the 
context of the USA where the social state has not been as well established as it is in, 
for example, Social democratic systems. The limitation of state involvement in such 
private spheres is, Fineman (2004) argues, deeply entwined with other ideological 
perspectives, such as a belief in free market capitalism and the notion of meritocracy. 
Anti-statist ideas have become more widely adopted -by both the libertarian Right 
and Left. Liberty in this context being defined as freedom from government. 
Fineman (2004) suggests that the results are that liberty has become more highly 
valued than equality. Thus, role of the state in this model has become to decide 
between competing individual claims and ensure fair treatment. Vulnerability is 
different for different people. Fineman’s (2008) use of the term is a basis for a politics 
of welfare based on reciprocity. Fineman’s use of the term is radical different to the 
current usage across health and social care. In the current context, it is used in a 
much more paternalistic fashion -often denying agency and choice in contradiction 
of broader stated policy aims of empowerment and independence. In Fineman’s 
work, itis the basis for a mutual understanding or reciprocity. The focus on 
individualism ignores or seeks to set aside the basic conditions of mutuality that are 
required for social systems to function. This is particularly the case in the provision 
of care, ‘care’ being used in its broadest sense here. Current systems privatise our 
collective responsibility for care.  
 
 
As I was working on this, Mrs May danced on stage at the Tory Party conference 
and announced that austerity was at an end. It remains to be seen what this will 
mean. The implications of Brexit for health and social welfare services will be 
profound. It appears that there will be an increased involvement of the market in 
these areas. In addition, restrictions on movement will have potentially huge 
impacts on staffing and recruitment. It is depressing to note that the linking of high 
skills with high wages means that the vast majority who those who work in this 
sector supporting their fellow citizens are regarded as low skill workers because 
they earn under £50 thousand. In June 2016, the UN’s Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights published a damning report that stated that the impact of 
the government’s policies of austerity and welfare reform amount to a breach of  
their obligations under human rights policies. In particular, they highlighted the fact  
that more people were reliant on food banks; high rates of unemployment; the poor 
provision of mental health care; an increase in homelessness and; increasing 
discrimination against migrants. The UN Committee highlighted the 
disproportionate adverse impact that austerity measures have on the most 
disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups.  
 
Fineman’s notion of vulnerability can be the starting point for challenging  
the notions of individualism and choice. This is not to say that we should not treat 
people as individuals or recognise that they have a right to exercise choices. It is 
rather a recognition of the limits of the ultimate utility of these concepts. Choices can 
only be exercised within a social context. This must include the resources available 
but also the social status of the individual making the choices. The right and power 
to make choices is not distributed evenly amongst individuals. Without economic 
rights then many groups are unable to exercise political and social rights. If we use 
Fineman’s (2008) notion of vulnerability, we will see it as universal, constant and 
deeply rooted in the human condition. We all share this quality. It is not a 
characteristic of particular individuals or groups. This approach leads to a positivist 
identification or the creation of vulnerable populations and groups Fineman’s focus 
is to argue that we are or should be seen as vulnerable subjects. She has argued that 
the notion of autonomy that underpins individualism is a myth. The cultural focus 
on individualism hides the social reality of our interconnectedness. We share what 
she terms a messy dependency. Social work acknowledges this. However, the rise of 
care management and other organisational approaches has seen the use of the 
discourse of rights and empowerment bolstering practices that are increasingly 
bureaucratic. The term “vulnerable” is subsumed in an organisational and 
professional culture that limits rather than extends rights. Fineman’s use of the term 
is radically different. It is a basis for genuine reciprocity and a call for a more 
responsive state and equal society.  
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